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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This Appeal is taken from an Order entered by the Honorable G. Hal
Taylor, Third District Court for Salt Lake County, dismissing this case with prejudice for
lack of prosecution.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case is an action to recover money allegedly misappropriated from a
corporation. The counterclaim asks for an accounting of corporation assets.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On October 15, 1981, the Court entered an Order dismissing this case with
prejudice for lack of prosecution. The Order was based on a Motion filed September 4,
1981 and arguments

bef~re

the Court on October 5, 1981.
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::SOUGHT ON

~-'!?~~. A.1:

Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the Order dismissing the case so that
the case may be remanded and a trial held in the matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter was initiated with the filing of a Complaint by plaintiff-

respondent K.L.C. Incorporated in 1967, asking for $9,696.00 allegedly appropriated from
plaintiff by defendant (R. 2-3). Defendant-appellant answered the Complaint and filed a
counterclaim against plaintiff-respondent K.L.C. Incorporated and against counter
defendants-respondents Kern's Liquidation Center, Inc. and John Paras alleging a half
ownership in the plaintiff corporation jointly with counter defendant John Paras, and
asking for an accounti~ of corporation assets alleged to be worth at least $155,346.91
(R.6-11).
Defendant-appellant's original attorney withdrew from the matter in the
fall of 1968 (R.47), and defendant-appellant obtained new counsel (R.48).
In July of 1976, the parties entered into a stipulation agreeing to an
accounting by defendant-appellant of counter defendants-respondents' books and to
either dismissal of the action following the accounting or to further consideration of
the matter by the court using the results of the accounting as a basis for judgment
(R.53).

In March of 1980, defendant-appellant again obtained new counsel, a notice
of substitution of counsel being dated March 13, 1980 (R.54).
On March 27, 1980, a Notice of Taking Deposition was served on plaintiffrespondent and counter defendants-respondents (R.55).

The deposition of counter

defendant-respondent John Paras was actually taken on July 18, 1980.
On September 10, 1980, interrogatories were served by defendant on
counter defendant-respondent John Paras (R. 58-60).

-2-
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On December 18, 1980, defendant-appellant filed its Request for Trial
Setting (R.61 ).
On May 5, 1981, counter defendant-respondent John Paras served answers
to defendant's ir1terrogatories (R. 62-65).
On May 18, 1981, trial in this matter was set for October 22, 1981 by the
Third District Court for Salt Lake County (R.66).
On August 28, 1981, defendant-appellant requested a jury trial and
tendered the $50.00 jury fee (R.67).
On September 4, 1981, plaintiff-respondent K.L.C. Incorporated and counter defendant-respondent John Paras filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution
(R.68).
On October 15, 1981, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor dismissed the action for
lack of prosecution.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE

. The trial court erred and abused its discretion
in

dism~ing

this Action for Jack of prosecution

inasmuch as the ease had been diligently prmecuted

for a full year and one-half prior to the time that the
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution was f'tled,
trial had been set,

and defendant-appellant had

expended time, effort, and money in prosecuting the
case and in preparing for triaL

Although there are many Utah Supreme Court decisions dealing with
dismissal of a case for lack of prosecution, none of these cases appear to treat factual
issue similar to those raised here.
In the present case, although there appear to be substantial periods during
which no action was taken by either side, there was diligent prosecution of the case
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to

dismiss for lack of prosecution. Thus, defendant-appellant retained new counsel after
a period of time during which the case apparently lay dorment. New counsel immediately noticed the deposition of counter defendant John Paras. The deposition was
taken, interrogatories were served and answered, and the case was set for trial It was
not until September 4, 1981, just a month and a half prior to the date scheduled for
trial that plaintiff filed its motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. The motion was
not made until over three months had passed from the time trial was scheduled and
followed defendant's request for a jury trial and payment of the required fee.
Defendant-appellant had gone to significant expense and effort to move
the matter along by taking a deposition, serving interrogatories, and preparing for
trial. Plaintiff-respondent and counter defendants-re~ondents had also expended time
and effort in connection with the deposition and in answering interrogatories, and
proceeded toward trial for a year and one-half before filing their motion for dismissaL
Although it may have been proper to dismiss this case for lack of
prosecution on a motion made in March or April of 1980 immediately after action by
defendant-appellant to move it forward, it is submitted that such dismissal is
improper and a clear abuse of discretion after defendant-appellant's substantial efforts
to move the case ahead and after the case had been set for trial
While this Court has not previously addressed this issue, courts in several
other states have. Thus, in a case before the Colorado Court of Appeals, Farber v.
Green Shoe Mfg. Company, 596 P.2d 398 (1979), in which no action had been taken for
over five years until a notice to set trial was filed and trial was set, and in which just
prior to trial a motion to dismiss was filed and granted, the court said:
Here the motion to dismiss was made after the
plaintiff had resumed his efforts to prosecute, had
set the case for trial, and indeed, was ready for trial
on the very day the motion was heard. Under the
circumstances, the policy underlying the dismassal
rule to prevent unreasonable delays is les.s compel-
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e policy favoring resolution of disputes
on the merits. Denham v. Superior Court, 2 CaL 3d
557, 86 CaL Rpts. 65, 468 P.2d 193(1970). Consequently, we hold that the court erred in dismissing
the action.
.uu6

'" . .

We adopt the rule stated in State v. McClaine,
261 Ind. 60, 300 N.E.2d 342 (1973):
'A motion to dismiss for want
of prosecution should not be
granted if the plaintiff resumes diligent prosecution of
his claim, even though, at
some prior period of time, he
has been guilty of gross negligence.'

Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alabama in reviewing a lower court's
dismissal for lack of prosecution said in Smith v. Wilcox County Board of Education,
365 So.2d 659 (1978):

Although there appeared to be a long period of ·
inactivity from 1966 to 1973, nevertheless within
the eleven months before the dismissal the defendants filed interrogatories, the parties reconstructed
the record, and the plaintiff's attorney had tried to
have a hearing set on the case.
and further on said:
.•• even where there has been a period of inactivity,
present diligence has barred dismissal
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in reversing a lower court's dismissal for lack of
prosecution in Laurie v. Ezard, 595 S. W.2d 336 (1980), said:
A dismissal for failure to prosecute should not
be based on remote, even if extended, periods of
inactivity. Yonder Haar Concrete Company v. Edwards-Parker, Inc. supra, 561 S. W.2d at 139. In
determining whether to dismiss a dormant case, we
believe that the time a case has been on file and its
prior inactivity may be considered. However, to
dismiss a case for prior inactivity while it was being
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pursued could cause many ca,.-.;·; ~ .~ ,~,. ~, . ;.;""_ -~ which should not be. Human nature being what- it-ls-

a~~orneys and parties ma~ not always act in ~
d11lgent manner. Our examination of the cases cited
by the parties and other cases leads us to believe
that only in an unusual situation should a case be
dismissed for prior inactivity, on a party's motion,
at a time when it appeared to be prosecuted toward
triaL

The Supreme Court of New Mexico in Dollison v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company, 423 P.2d 426 (1966) held that, once a case had been set for trial, it was too
late for a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution.
Several states have formal rules which 5l)ecify that a case can be dismissed
for lack of prosecuion if no action is taken in the case for more than a year. Even in
these jurisdictions, if prosecution of the case is resumed prior to the time a motion to
dismiss in made, motion is regarded as too late. Thus, the Supreme Court of Alaska in
First National Bank of Fairbanks v. Taylor, 488 P.2d 1026 (1971) said:
In our view, the rule applies only where the
motion to dismiss is filed before the period of the
lapse is terminated by some affirmative action, that
is where the last act in the record occurred more
than one year prior to the motion to dismiss. Here
the Bank's motion for pre-trial terminated the lapse,
and the Motion for Summary Judgment and motion
to set for trial were filed subsequent to the lapse
and prior to Taylor's motion to diSmiss.
and the District Court of Appeal of Florida, in Equity Capital Company v. 602 West 26
Corp. 223 So.2d 762 (1969), said:
The moving party must seek dismissal prior to
resumption of affirmative action toward prosecution
of the case (citations omitted).
Since defendants did not move for dismissal
prior to July 29, 1968, the date plaintiff filed its
motion for deficiency decree, and the court did not
dismiss this suit on its own motion prior to that
date, dismissal for failure to prosecute was improper.
Defendant-appellant submits that dismissal for failure to prosecute in this
case was improper and that the order should be reversed. Since defendant-appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Kine case for over a year prior to the motion to dismiss,

defendant-appellant should be allowed his day in court.
POINT TWO

The trial eourt erred and abused its discretionin
dismissing this action for Jack of prosecution, whae
during the period of time that it is alleged the Jack of

prosecution occurred, the party moving for dismissal
could have taken action to move the litigation ahead

to a final conclusion but did not do so.
In the present case, either plaintiff-respondent or counter defendantsrespondents could have taken action to move the case to trial or to have the case
dismissed, but neither did so.
This Court, in upholding the lower court in its refusal to dismiss a case for
lack of prosecution in Department of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323 {1980),
said:
The important fact is that the defendant himself did nothing to move the case forward, but
appears to have been quite contented to let it lie
dormant until it was re·activated by the plaintiff.
In Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P.2d 1368 (1977), this Court reversed the
lower court's dismissal for lack of prosecution and said:
As to the lack of prosecution, it seems that
neither party had any active interest in the matter
for nearly four years•••• Since either party could have
brought the matter to a conclusion it is difficult to
see why the plaintiff should be denied his claim to
more than $38,000 simply because counsel for plaintiff did not take a default judgment.
In Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P .2d 1135, (1977), this court said:

Turning now to the issue as to whether or not
a lapse of 16 months in prosecuting a claim for
relief is sufficient to support a dismissal with prejudice, this court has been active in that area and
has held that where all of the litigants had power to

-7-
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obtain relief and failed to do so it is error to
dismiss with prejudice.
'
and in Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractors, Inc., 544 P.2d
876 (1975), this court said:

Whether there is such justifiable excuse is to be
determined by considering more factors than merely
the length of time since the suit was filed. Some
consideration should be given to the conduct of both
parties, and to the opportunity each has had to move
the case forward and what they have done about it. ••
Further in that case, this Court said:

It is indeed commendable to handle cases with
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition in
order to keep them up to date. But it is even more
important to keep in mind that the very reason for
the existence of courts is to afford disputants an
opportunity to be heard and to do justice between
them.
Here, plaintiff-respondent, the party who initiated the lawsuit, had the
same opportunity that defendant-respondent did to move it along. It did not do so.
Counter defendants-respondents also had such opportunity.

They did not do so.

Defendant-appellant submits that dismissal for lack of prosecution was improper.
CONLUSION
Defendant-respondent had actively pursued prosecution of this case from
March of 1980.

It was not until September, 1981, that plaintiff-respondent and

counter defendant-respondent moved to dismiss for lack of prosecution. This was long
after trial had been scheduled and only a month and a half prior to triaL

Where a

party has taken action to pursue prosecution of a case, it is submitted that the case
should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution even though there have been prior
periods as to which such dismissal might have been proper. Further, where any party
could have moved the action ahead, but none of them did so, it is believed improper to
dismiss for lack of prosecution when one party actively moves forward.
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oruef u1s1111ssing this case for lack of prosecution should be reversed

and the case remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,

Robert R. Mallinckrodt
Mallinckrodt & Mallinckrodt

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The foregoing Appellant's Brief was served on plaintiff-respondent and
counter defendants-respondents by mailing two copies thereof, first class mail,
postage prepaid, to Earl S. Spafford, Esq., Spafford, Dibb, Duffin & Jensen, 311 South
State, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, their attorneys, this 22nd day of January,
1982.

..
Robert R. Mallinckrodt
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